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ABSTRACT 
I discuss the main claims in a new book on the origins of morality (Salvador Giner, El ori-
gen de la moral. Ética y valores en la sociedad actual, Ediciones Península, Barcelona 2012, 
419 pp.). These are: i) our time, far from being the twilight of morality, is the first time in 
human history when a universalistic and autonomous morality has emerges as a social 
phenomenon, not just as a philosophical theory; ii) even if thousand years of rational phi-
losophical discussion of morality has yielded valuable insights, yet a fresh start of critical 
reflexion on morality qua phenomenon is first possible now, starting with a sociological 
understanding of  morality as spontaneous emergence of codes of norms; iii) sociology is 
intrinsically ethical theory, since at a certain point, no empirical and technocratic proc-
essing of social data still makes sense and sociological discourse has to become reflexive, 
interpretive, and most of all, construed in terms of explicit valuations. 
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The thesis argued for in the book is that our times, far from being the time of 
the twilight of morality, are the times when the basic principles of citizen-
ship have become a shared legacy, the idea of human rights has become a 
new universal alphabet for moral discourse, and the requirement of decency 
in the public life has become widely felt. Our times are no hard times for mo-
rality. There is a basis for such widely shared moral sentiments, neither a 
relativist nor a supernatural one, but instead an ethical intuition shared by 
every decent human being. This is the claim argued in a rather bulky mono-
graph by a sociologist who feels self-confident enough as to make a raid into 
the field of philosophy, Salvador Giner, Professor of Sociology at the Univer-
sity of Barcelona and the author of several books in theoretical sociology and 
sociology of religion. 
I will try to follow the main line of the overall argument through the 
book’s eleven chapters. In the introduction Giner declares that sociology is 
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ethics for our times. Some time ago, sociology broke into the world of moral 
philosophy and transformed it, or at least tried to do so. This was done by 
Tönnies by his idea of “community”, followed more or less felicitously by all 
the great sociological classics. Most of the twentieth-century philosophical 
thinking about morality yet, albeit with the remarkable exceptions of Una-
muño, Santayana and Bergson, forgot the lesson of the sociological classics 
or never paid attention to it. The point Giner wants to make is that we have 
indeed a heritage of many centuries of purely philosophical reflection on the 
good life, which is not too bad as far as it is rational reflection, free from 
dogmatism and myth; besides we have something that has hold the spot in 
the last years, namely biological theories of morality, from Darwinian evolu-
tionism and socio-biology to neuro-science; this is not too bad too, as far as 
the knowledge of the biological basis of moral reactions is an important part 
of the story. What is wrong yet is the resulting overall picture in present dis-
cussion on morality, a picture made of either purely philosophical considera-
tions, be they either about language and logic or about conscience, decision 
and existence, and so-called naturalization programs, supposedly converging 
with materialist-biological reductionist ideologies. The main point is that 
there are other possible kinds or levels of “reduction” that have no reason to 
be ashamed when facing biological reduction and are instead the only viable 
candidates as accounts of a number of important phenomena – think of revo-
lutions, a topic ignored by moral philosophers – that may hope of an account 
only at the sociological level, or at the level of a “macro-ethics” (something 
analogous to macroeconomics). 
Chapter 1, Sovereignty of morality, starts with the suggestion that the 
very birth of morality lies at the point in history when the idea of an inde-
pendent moral law, sovereign vis-à-vis earthly sovereigns and powers was 
formulated. This may be the point in human history which is mythically de-
scribed by Antigones’s story of. But troubles started very soon, as soon as 
philosophers began working out principles of morality while disregarding so-
cial contexts within which only such principles could arise and indeed make 
sense. This holds true for Plato’s Republic, even if it does not for Aristotle, 
who was well-aware of the dual, individual and social, character of morality. 
And yet, some kind of Platonic twist was left in subsequent ethical reflection 
so that, forgetting Aristotle’s teaching, two allegedly alternative lines of in-
quiry established themselves, that of “ethical sovereignism” and that of 
“ethical sociologism”. 
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Chapter 2, Toward a socialization of morality, outlines the history of a 
current at the crossroad between the history of moral thinking and the his-
tory of social science, which gradually separated itself from the “overarch-
ing” view of ethics. The current, whose seeds may be found in Aristotle, in-
cludes Montaigne, Adam Smith, Nietzsche, and comes close to, even it does 
not really reach it, an account of morality based on its socio-genesis. 
Chapter 3, The sociological rescue of ethics, carries out an examination of 
the original moral interest of sociology and its following subversion, para-
doxically originated by its own original assumptions. “Sociology was born as 
an essential part of a revolution that took place within ethics. The revolution 
consisted in the discovery of the historical character and the social condi-
tioning of moral principles and rules” (p. 67). The revolutions took place at 
the time when an opposite, or better complementary, revolution was being 
carried out by Kant, namely the rationalistic re-orientation of ethics. The 
two opposite approaches did not severe relations with each other and “in-
deed they are not eventually incompatible. And this is one of the conjectures 
in the present work” (p. 67). The chapter starts with a parallel analysis of 
Marx and Comte arguing that, for both of them, the sociological theory qua 
moral discourse is an essential part of their intellectual enterprise, even when 
Marx declares morality to be mere ideology. The chapter then goes on recon-
structing sociological analyses by Tönnies, Durkheim, Simmel and Weber. 
The point of the reconstruction is that all the four authors try to spell out, 
albeit in a somewhat defective way, the same basic message construed by 
Tönnies in terms of a tension between community and society; the core of the 
message is that the source of morality lies in community (p. 109), that mo-
rality outside community is like Kant’s bird freed from the obstacle provided 
by the atmosphere and therefore unable to use its own wings for flying. 
Chapter 4, The shaping of good and evil, addresses one further step under-
taken by twentieth-century social theory, namely the discovery of the exis-
tence of evil and wickedness as such, leaving xix century too optimist pre-
comprehension of social evils as originating from backwardness, power, or a 
disorderly economic system. The discovery is not new as such, but it is terri-
fic as a discovery outside of a theological context, namely, as the discovery 
of evil without any possible theodicy. The contributors to such discovery are 
Schopenhauer, Freud, Elias and Arendt. The core of the discovery was that 
the sin of all progressive projects from the xix century was a radical kind of 
naiveté, namely the belief in a resurrection, albeit in a distant future, of the 
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good savage. Not even Marxism, the most disenchanted among such pro-
jects, is free from such lapse into a naïve view of human nature. 
Chapter 5, An unsafe victory, is a discussion of the status of sociology to-
day. Giner suggest that, on the one hand, a sociological way of thinking has 
deeply influenced the social sciences and politics, but also the public dis-
course. On the other, the positivist scientific ideology has been dominating 
to a wide extent, so that a massive use is made of sociological enquiries by 
firms and governments, which is not too bad, but of enquiries understood in 
the most dogmatic way as collection of data, which is bad enough. Giner’s 
rejoinder is not an appeal to some kind of “critical sociology”, which would 
be sheer nonsense, since sociology simply has to be critical in order to be so-
ciology, but instead a vindication of a proper room for value judgments in 
sociology, against the contradictory myth of any value-free social science. 
His point is that value judgments are there, with no shame, in all sciences, 
the natural sciences included, and it is a nonsense, arising from some kind of 
inferiority complex vis-à-vis the so-called hard sciences, that social scientists 
feel it as a duty to do what no scientist ever did. Such value judgments are 
faithfulness to facts, objectivity, as well as a commitment to contribute in 
finding remedies to obvious human evils. Thus, sociology is both scientific 
and humanistic, it is intrinsically moral discourse without any need to fall 
into second-hand normative ethics, or preaching and moralizing. 
Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the process through which, in Western liberal-
democratic societies, a kind of construction of shared tables of values has 
taken place by way of contractarian processes. In philosophy Rawls and his 
school have provided a kind of model of such historical process. No doubt, 
such kind of public morality we enjoy now in our countries is a step forward 
when contrasted with totalitarian, tyrannical, feudal and tribal moralities, 
but this is not tantamount to saying that we have to be satisfied with it. In-
deed, emptiness is its major vice. It consists not so much in some kind of 
convergence about moral values as in an agreement about what we are pre-
pared to tolerate. 
Chapter 8, A friendly visit to moral philosophy, argues that there is a seri-
ous problem in twentieth-century moral philosophy, namely the philosophy 
starting with Moore’s Principia ethica. The problem lies in the attempt at 
giving ethics a new start by isolating it completely from all the previous his-
tory of moral thinking as well as from all other disciplines. The main points 
are that the separation between facts and values is itself a terrible fallacy, 
and besides, that isolating ethics from neurology, biology, psychology, ge-
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netics is legitimate, even if it meets with serious troubles (p. 255), but estab-
lishing its autonomy vis-à-vis the study of society is even more difficult, and 
perhaps impossible (p. 255). Any decent social science yields a normative so-
cial science, which overlaps fairly well with part of moral philosophy. Only 
the non-existing chimera of technocratic value-free social science would ap-
parently escape from such overlapping and fit well the dichotomy between 
autonomous ethical theory and descriptive social science. Besides, soon after 
Moore established the dichotomy, it was violated by three remarkable ex-
amples of “a moral philosophy inspired by an imagination and a language 
overtly associated with social philosophy” (p. 242), namely the moral phi-
losophy of Bergson, Unamuño, and Santayana. 
After the interlude provided by chapters 9-10 on more usual themes such 
as civil society, universalism and citizenship, chapter 11, Moral genesis of 
human society comes back to the basic issue. The question is: “Does a moral-
ity exists today on which we could rely? That is, does a shared morality exist 
that we all should and could endorse? And, in case it did exist, who has the 
authority to speak to everybody in its name, so that also those who are not 
his co-parishioners would listen to him?” (p. 339). And Giner’s answer is that 
“the social production of moral values and attitudes has reached a turning 
point where the latter, now more than ever in the past, are what produce so-
ciety, not the other way round, as it used to be the case in the past”. This 
answer puts Giner in a position to reach a tentative conclusion that is, after 
all, not devoid of hope, since those value that allow for “a moral production 
of society are essentially rational ones, friendly to liberty and fostering fair 
relationships among human beings” (p. 343). More in detail, Giner argues 
that the fact of cultural and moral plurality, after a phase during which it 
has been generating a feeling of bewilderment, has powerfully implemented a 
process of creation of a universal morality which has indeed social origins 
but whose contents are not social, but instead rooted in the ability for ab-
straction with which human beings are endowed. It is “a part of our ontol-
ogy” (p. 393) or, in other words, it is rooted in human nature. Its main con-
tent is basically the golden rule, the rule that all major civilizations and reli-
gious traditions have discovered. It is from adhesion to this imperative that 
in our times a universal morality is emerging as a historical fact. It is true 
that this is a social fact originated by one given socio-historical process, and 
as such, heavily euro-centric. But this is just a fact, and no reason for any 
feeling of guilt. It is just a fact that in Europe and in its over-sea appendices 
the production of such social phenomenon has taken place. 
SERGIO CREMASCHI 
560 
 
And, as announced, these times are not amoral times. For the benefit of 
those who, from time to time, complain “with frivolous arguments of the 
moral void and demise of values (which one?) in contemporary society” (p. 
380) Giner points at such examples as Gandhi, Martin Luther King and the 
Basque movement “Gesto per la Paz” that dared to denounce the terrorist 
band ETA as well as the Spanish government’s illegal exercise of violence as 
examples of that “evidential ethics” which has emerged as a shared ethos in 
the twentieth century, and which he believes to point at the golden rule or at 
other analogous formulations as a summary. What they can do, constitute 
the kernel of the emerging universal morality. “Evidential” means: let eve-
rybody know the facts as they are, and the moral judgment will come, and 
will be out of question. In practice, human beings do not need to consult the 
theory, the quite abstract formulation of the categorical imperative, in order 
to exercise Aristotelian sunesis (or, I would add, Kantian judgment or 
Smithian moral sentiments) and perceive immediately “whether they are do-
ing the good or betray, steal, are true, are deceitful” (p. 396). 
Let me add s few comments. I warmly agree with Giner’s antipathy for 
multiculturalism as an ideology, which is not rejection of multi-culturality as 
a condition; I sympathize with his refusal of relativist communitarianism as 
a shabby moral philosophy; I like his liquidation of censors of the demise of 
values in the modern world. Besides, I appreciate his rescue of the Scots, 
Montesquieu and Montaigne, and his reading of Nietzsche as a failed would-
be sociologist, and I would recite a mea culpa for having omitted in my own 
history of twentieth-century ethics1 the three authors he praises for having 
stubbornly insisted in thinking of morality in social terms, namely Una-
muño, Bergson and Satayana. This said and done, I come to discussing 
briefly a couple of more serious points. 
The first concerns analytic ethics. I feel that the fact of discussing con-
temporary modern ethical theory starting with Moore and the tradition to 
which he has given origin is welcome by a sociologist from the European 
Continent. It gives the feeling that we are starting discussing real issues. And 
I enjoyed the fact that Giner, a Continental and a Sociologist, does not feel 
subdued by the Analytic pretence of a superior logical and scientific charac-
ter for their own theories. I would say that starting a re-examination of the 
analytic “research programme” in ethics from the point of view the analytics 
                                                            
1 S. Cremaschi, L'etica del Novecento. Dopo Nietzsche (Roma: Carocci, 2005). 
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have always refused to take into consideration, that is, from a historical, cul-
tural, and sociological point of view, would be a first step towards intellec-
tual health. I would suggest that Moore’s separation of facts and values, and 
his construal of the very category “naturalism” (a category that has always 
been hard to explain to any continentally educated mind, and not because of 
the latter’s lack of power of abstraction but just because of incurable confu-
sion in the category itself), far from being discoveries of basic truths of ana-
lytic philosophy, have been confused tactical moves by a young man who 
was trying desperately to find a way out of the marshes of the over-
determined philosophical, moral, political, and religious controversy between 
Utilitarians and Intuitionists and remained with his boots trapped in the 
mud. That is, Moore’s ethics is not analytic enough, and most of the follow-
ing analytic tradition has kept up for one century discussing ill-framed ques-
tions. There is no reason why the respectable legacy of the analytic tradition, 
that is, logic, argument, attention paid to meaning and conceptual clarifica-
tion, should go with an extremely individualistic view of morality as such, a 
denial of the existence of moral traditions, ethoi, theological moral doctrines, 
all smashed together into a unsavoury puree named “common sense moral-
ity”.  
The other point is applied ethics. Giner stresses both its importance qua 
phenomenon, whose emergence points roughly at the same direction as the 
contractarian morality of co-existence whose theoretical model is Rawlsian 
ethics, and its ambivalence as a possible self-justification of the existing 
status quo or as a new and more sophisticated expression of the voluntary 
serfdom first theorized about by de La Boethie. I tend to be slightly more 
optimistic about applied ethics, as far as I believe that such approaches as 
the new casuistry, at least in one of its tendencies and approaches centred on 
deliberation stress precisely the dialogical, critical and rational/reasonable 
character of moral discourse, which is one of the two possible ways of under-
standing applied ethics. Needless to say, the other possible and dangerous 
outcome to which applied ethics may be bound is a technical-managerial dis-
cipline aimed at telling subject what they ought to think and feel, that is the 
Ethical State without the State, or the Ethical Corporation.  
And I come to the main point thanks to which the book comes as an 
agreeable surprise. The point is the social character of ethics as a discipline. 
The character was there in Aristotle, and this is well known. But the social 
character of moral philosophy was there in Grotius, Pufendorf and other 
Renaissance thinkers who gave the starting-signal to the social sciences, fol-
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lowed by Montesquieu, Adam Smith, John Millar and others. There is no 
problem about the fact that this has been a path going from practical phi-
losophy to empirical social sciences. The problem is that only the value-free 
technocratic self-image of social science had reasons for interpreting such 
process in terms of transition from “lore to science”. The point Giner aptly 
raises is that, at the end of the formula, we should add “and back”, that is, 
that moral discourse unavoidably is born anew from within the social sci-
ences. This indeed, not so much what it argues for about ethics in the public 
domain, which amounts to widely shared claims, is the main point for which 
the book recommends itself. The exciting novelty is the fact that, starting 
with present-day discussion of issues like limits to growth, right to informa-
tion, citizenship, and so on, Giner, instead of naively running into normative 
ethics founded on “intuitions” shared by “us” (but who is us?), or founded on 
heavy philosophical or theological assumptions shared by virtually nobody 
except the speaker, goes back to the big theoretical issue of the origin of mo-
rality as a phenomenon, sketches out a plausible sociological theory, makes 
normative principle arise out of the sociological theory itself as its pre-
conditions or conditions of possibility, or undeniable assumptions, and then 
has something new to say about the real world. 
(1) S. Cremaschi, L'etica del Novecento. Dopo Nietzsche (Roma: Ca-
rocci, 2005). 
 
 
